The conventional positivist model of scientific progress, which posits a linear accumulation of empirically verified facts, encounters profound difficulties when subjected to historical and philosophical scrutiny. This model rests on the axiomatic assumption of a stable, external reality accessible through theory-neutral observation. However, post-positivist critiques, particularly those emanating from Kuhnian analysis, challenge this foundation by introducing the concept of paradigmatic frameworks. These frameworks are not merely collections of theories but are comprehensive, conceptually autonomous systems that dictate the very terms of inquiry, the standards of evidence, and the ontology of the domain under investigation. The critical implication is the incommensurability of successive paradigms. A shift from one to another, such as the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, does not represent a simple refinement but an epistemological rupture. The core tenets and even the semantic content of key terms are fundamentally altered, precluding a direct, point-by-point comparison on a neutral metric. Consequently, empirical data cannot serve as an ultimate arbiter between competing paradigms, as the interpretation of such data is itself paradigm-contingent. This leads to the reification of theoretical constructs, wherein the abstract entities posited by a paradigm are treated as concrete realities within its sphere. The pursuit of scientific knowledge is thus recast not as a march toward absolute truth but as a series of discontinuous reconstructions. This reframing necessitates a move away from simple verificationism towards a more interpretive methodology, one that acknowledges the hermeneutic circle involved in understanding scientific worldviews from within their own conceptual architecture.