The Epistemological Limits of Positivism in Jurisprudence

The prevailing epistemological challenge within contemporary jurisprudence concerns the circumscription of its analytical domain by the tenets of empirical positivism. This philosophical inheritance from the natural sciences, which posits that veridical knowledge is exclusively derivable from sensory experience and logical deduction, engenders a profound methodological quandary when transposed onto the study of legal systems. The ontological status of legal precepts is fundamentally incongruous with that of physical phenomena. Whereas the properties of a celestial body are ascertainable through objective measurement and replicable experimentation, the validity of a legal norm is not an empirical attribute but a function of its position within a complex, non-empirical normative framework. Consequently, a strictly positivist methodology is constrained to analyzing only the observable epiphenomena of law—such as judicial behavior or statutory text—while occluding the very essence of legal authority, which is irreducibly normative. This methodological schism is further exacerbated by the failure of positivism to accommodate the intersubjective realities that undergird legal systems. Law does not subsist as an independent entity; rather, it is constituted through shared belief, interpretation, and collective intentionality—a web of social constructions that fundamentally defies empirical quantification. To treat legal concepts as mere artifacts for detached observation is to perpetrate a category error, conflating the symbolic with the substantive and misapprehending their operative force. Such an approach inevitably yields a reductive account, stripping jurisprudential inquiry of its capacity to grapple with questions of justice, legitimacy, and meaning. The insistence on a hegemonic methodological framework, borrowed uncritically, therefore precludes a holistic understanding, compelling a disciplinary pivot towards hermeneutic modes of inquiry that explicitly acknowledge the interpretive and socially embedded nature of legal phenomena.

Câu hỏi luyện tập

1. What is the central argument of the passage regarding the application of empirical positivism to jurisprudence?

2. According to the text, what term describes knowledge that is exclusively derived from sensory experience and logical deduction?

3. The passage implies that a 'holistic understanding' of law would necessarily involve what?

4. The author states that a strictly positivist approach is limited to analyzing what observable aspects of law?

5. How does the passage contrast the 'ontological status' of legal precepts with that of physical phenomena?

6. The passage asserts that treating legal concepts as mere objects for observation constitutes what kind of intellectual mistake?

7. The text suggests that an uncritical adoption of a dominant scientific methodology prevents a comprehensive grasp of law. What phrase describes this dominant methodology?

8. The author characterizes the positivist analysis of law as ultimately providing a what?

9. What does the author propose as a necessary disciplinary shift for jurisprudence?

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